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Trading Well-Being
for Economic Efficiency:
The 1990 Shift in EU Childcare Policies
Inge Bleijenbergh
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Jeanne de Bruijn
SUMMARY. In 1992, the European Union (EU) adopted the Recom-
mendation on Childcare and became involved in childcare policy. For
the first time, care services and domestic care were acknowledged as the
common responsibility of all the European and national political units.
The article shows the interaction between childcare policy at the Euro-
pean level and in three welfare states with strong male breadwinner
policy logics: Germany, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom
(UK). At the European and national levels, arguments prioritizing eco-
nomic efficiency and equal opportunities gained ground at the expense
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of arguments prioritizing the well-being of children. Formerly male
breadwinner states reached a consensus on the policy goal of shared re-
sponsibility for caregiving by emphasizing common economic interests
and the principle of equal opportunities while still allowing for nation
variability in how this policy goal will be carried out. [Article copies available
for a fee from The Haworth Document Delivery Service: 1-800-HAWORTH.
E-mail address: <docdelivery@haworthpress.com> Website: <http://www.
HaworthPress.com> © 2006 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.]
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In 1992, the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU) intro-
duced the Recommendation on Childcare, committing itself to stimu-
lating the development of childcare services in its member states.1 It
“recommended that Member States should take and/or progressively
encourage initiatives to enable women and men to reconcile their oc-
cupational, family and upbringing responsibilities arising from the care
of children” (Official Journal of the European Communities,
1992a, p. 17). The Recommendation consists of seven articles that for-
mulate common goals on the affordability and accessibility of the ser-
vices, the introduction of care leaves, the organization of work and the
sharing of care responsibilities between men and women. Thought at
first glance to be a measure of mere symbolic value, the Recommenda-
tion on Childcare illustrated an important conceptual change pertaining
to the responsibility of the EU. With this Recommendation, childcare
policy (formal day care and out-of-school care and care by recognized
host parents) became a topic of EU concern. Still emphasizing the com-
mon responsibility of governments, employers, trade unions and fami-
lies for childcare services, it was the first time European social policy
crossed the paid employment nexus and became involved in unpaid as
well as paid care.
At the same time in various European welfare states, public childcare
became a topic of political concern. This was especially striking in
countries with strong male breadwinner policy logics like Germany, the
Netherlands, and the UK. Here services were traditionally limited and
childcare was considered a private responsibility (Bussemaker, 1998;
Lewis, 1997). In this article, we analyze the European policy debates
leading to the Childcare Recommendation and the simultaneous de-
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bates in Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK. We selected these three
countries with strong traditional gender values (male policy logics) and
low levels of childcare provision, because we expected the biggest shift
to be made in these countries.
In 1989, in the Netherlands and the UK 2% of the children in the 0-3
age group went to public day care; in West-Germany this was 3%. This
contrasted with countries with less traditional gender values (moderate
or weak breadwinner policy logics) like Denmark and France, that pro-
vided public childcare for 44% and 25% of the same age group (Phillips
& Moss, 1989). In this article, we examine the arguments used by vari-
ous political actors in the EU, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK to
support or impede new initiatives on childcare and the political factors
that created opportunities for a shift in childcare policy. Did the emerg-
ing policy logic at the EU level resemble national policy logics or were
there clear differences between the national and supranational levels?
What were the contributions of the different countries to the debates
leading to the Childcare Recommendation? And how did they
implement the Recommendation?
THEORY
The aim of this article is to demonstrate how assumptions concerning
gender relations play a role in the development of European social pol-
icy and how social policy at the European and national level interacts.
To analyze gender assumptions in national and European social policy,
we use the analytical concept of “policy logics.” Policy logics are the
assumptions, principles and premises of welfare regimes, here espe-
cially related to gender (Lewis & Hobson, 1997, p. 6; Sainsbury, 1999).
The concept of policy logics emerged from the theoretical pursuit of a
welfare typology that does justice to the role of gender assumptions in
social policy. Mainstream classifications like Esping-Andersen’s
(1990) triad of corporatist, liberal and social democrat welfare regimes
conceal gender differences within welfare states (Bussemaker & van
Kersbergen, 1994; Lewis, 1992; Orloff, 1993). Lewis (1992) and
Ostner and Lewis (1995) note that differences in gender assumptions
historically cut across mainstream typologies of welfare states. They
developed a gender classification focusing on strong, moderate and
weak male breadwinner regimes, later redefined as “gender policy
logics” (Lewis & Hobson, 1997, p. 2). One of the indicators used in
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their classification is the level of social services, particularly with
regard to childcare.
Male Breadwinner Policy Logic
There are “strong” male breadwinner policy logics in Germany, the
Netherlands, and the UK, the nations considered here. Ireland is another
strong male breadwinner policy state. In these nations, a lack of public
childcare services leads to low (mainly part-time) female labor market
participation and longstanding inequality between men and women in
regard to social security. In the strong breadwinner model countries,
there is a firm dividing line between public and private responsibility
for caregiving.
“Modified” male breadwinner policy logics are present in societies
such as France and Belgium. Such societies are characterized by a mod-
erate level of women’s full-time labor market participation and better
social security protection, because women have social protection as ei-
ther workers or mothers. In these states, the government accepts some
responsibility for helping families provide care for children while
parents are employed. There are “weak” male breadwinner policy
logics in Sweden and Denmark. Here a high level of women’s
full-time labor market participation combines with individual tax and
social security arrangements, and individual rights to public childcare
and parental leave. This is also called the “dual breadwinner policy
logic” (Bussemaker 1998; Lewis, 1997; Ostner & Lewis, 1995).
The concepts of welfare regimes and policy logics are not only used
to characterize national welfare states, but also to predict the develop-
ment of European social policy. Ostner and Lewis (1995) argue that the
EU would be unwilling to expand into the sphere of care provision be-
cause strong male policy logics prevail among the European member
states. Moreover, the emphasis on economic integration would prevent
the EU from becoming involved in care policy (Plantenga, 1997).
In this article we explain why, in contrast to these expectations, the
EU became involved in childcare policy in the 1990s. Moreover, we ex-
plain why childcare policies appeared in the same period on the political
agenda in three welfare states characterized as having strong male
breadwinner policy logics. To describe and explain these develop-
ments, we turn to the actors involved in the policy debates and the argu-
ments they used to justify their claims. At the European level, the major
actors are the member states in the Council of Ministers and in Euro-
pean institutions such as the European Commission and the European
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Parliament. At the national level, the main actors are political parties in-
side and outside the government. Other actors participate at both levels;
for example, the women’s movement is organized at the national and
European level, as are trade unions and employers’ organizations.
METHOD
Our research method was content analysis of primary and secondary
sources on European social policy. We reconstructed the European and
national debates on the basis of official documents, archival research,
using Departmental archives at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs, the
Hague, and the Archives of the European Communities at the European
University Institute in Florence. We also conducted semi-structured in-
terviews with key figures in the policy process and a literature review of
secondary sources.
We first reconstructed the policy debates on childcare on the basis of
policy documents, periodicals and archival sources. We performed con-
tent analysis of the material by organizing the arguments on the issues
of inclusion, equality, responsibility and activity. After that, we selected
arguments that we intuitively found to be the most outspoken and differ-
ent from each other. By placing them in chronological order, we re-
vealed the pattern of argumentation in the development of the debate.
To enhance the intersubjectivity of the analysis, we presented our re-
construction to a select group of key figures in the policy process on the
Childcare Recommendation, allowing them to correct misinterpreta-
tions and give additional information. We based our definitive recon-
struction on these interviews.
By analyzing the development of the policy debates on childcare, we
found three basic arguments on childcare. They include concern for
children’s well-being, equal opportunities for men and women, and
economic efficiency (see also Bussemaker, 1998). Political actors use
these arguments to justify different assumptions about the sectors of so-
ciety primarily responsible for the care of children: the state, the market,
non-governmental organizations, or parents. All three lines of reason-
ing are articulated to either defend or combat the expansion of childcare
facilities. First, we discuss and analyze arguments on children’s well-
being. They might be used to encourage state involvement, claiming
that public childcare enhances the development of young children. But
arguments on children’s well-being might also be used to oppose state
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involvement with childcare, claiming that children are best served by
being cared for at home by parents.
Second, we elaborate on arguments based on equal opportunities. A
reference to equal opportunities may be used to defend female labor
market participation and women’s economic independence, as well as
the collective public responsibility for providing childcare facilities.
Equal opportunities may also be used to emphasize fathers’ childcare
responsibility and thus focus on the sexual re-division of labor at home.
Third, we examine arguments pertaining to economic efficiency. The
central concern is whether day care facilities can be expected to keep the
welfare state affordable in the long term, for example, by enlarging the
labor force in times of low population growth. This argument may be
used to emphasize the common responsibility of the state, trade unions
and employers to invest in public care facilities. Arguments of eco-
nomic efficiency may, however, also be used to oppose state invest-
ments in childcare. To restrict public expenditure and reduce labor
costs, the responsibility may be left to the private sector, emphasizing
the individual responsibility of parents and the role of private agencies
in civil society. We compared the use of these three arguments during
the policy preparation process with the final content of the policy,
investigating what arguments came to be dominant and how this can be
explained.
RESULTS
We first analyze the European debates on childcare and then compare
them with the debates at the national level. The childcare debate began
in the 1980s, when a European policy network of women emerged and
feminists (“femocrats”) came to work at the European Commission and
European Parliament (Hoskyns, 1996). The Commission was the first to
mention the need for government action in the field of childcare in its
first Equal Opportunities Action Programme for 1982-1985 (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 1981). In this period, five Direc-
tives on Equal Treatment of Women and Men were developed;
European Commission “femocrats” put the topic of childcare on the
agenda in an effort to broaden equal treatment policy from labor market
policy to the broader field of welfare provisions. On the initiative of its
Committee on the Rights of Women, in 1986 the European Parliament
joined the European debate on childcare policies. Arguments on chil-
dren’s well-being dominated its contribution. In a resolution on
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childcare, the European Parliament stated, “One of the fundamental fea-
tures of childcare centres is that they provide nursery education for all
children, and that this education can offset inequalities experienced by
certain socially and culturally disadvantaged groups, giving them a
basic level of equal opportunity” (Official Journal of the European
Communities, 1986, p. 22).
In the resolution, the European Parliament encouraged state respon-
sibility for care facilities, primarily to increase social equality among
children. In particular, the members of the Committee for Women’s
Rights and the European Socialist Party (the present-day PSE) argued
that childcare could be provided by public and private organizations,
but the national state should have final responsibility. Access to
childcare facilities should be a basic social right and the European Com-
mission should develop a draft Directive on equal access to childcare fa-
cilities. These arguments are in keeping with dual caregiver policy
logics.
However, opponents to European childcare policy also refer to chil-
dren’s well-being. In the European Parliament, the main opposition is
from the Christian Democrats, unified in the European People’s Party
(PPE). In the debate on the resolution text, Mr. Estgen, a member of the
PPE for Luxembourg, argued that children are best cared for by their
close relatives. His line of reasoning fits a strong male breadwinner
policy logic:
The family provides the most suitable framework for children to
grow up in because it is the most natural. That is not a reactionary
retreat into Conservative ideology, but an open-minded reaction to
scientifically supported findings. Childcare institutions, even at
their best, are and always will be a third best solution for very
young children. The best is always being cared for by the parents,
the second best is being cared for by relatives such as grandpar-
ents, and in my view communal social facilities should come only
as a last resort.” (Debates of the European Parliament, 1986, p. 20)
From this standpoint, the PPE argued against a basic right to
childcare facilities and wanted to leave childcare to the family and pri-
vate companies. The state should financially support these initiatives
and have budgetary authority over them. This was a minority standpoint.
With an overwhelming majority, the European Parliament adopted a res-
olution to order the European Commission to present a draft directive on
childcare (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1986).
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The political climate in the 1980s was, however, not conducive to an
expansion of European social policy. Feminists at the European Com-
mission and European Parliament called for action, but the Council of
Ministers opposed any expansion of European social legislation. Hedy
D’Ancona, former Dutch minister of Welfare, Health and Culture (per-
sonal communication, June 16, 1999), claims there was a strong fear of
opposition from the Thatcher government. It was probably because of
this opposition that in its second Equal Opportunities Programme
(1986-1990), the European Commission decided to first build more
support for the topic by announcing the foundation of a Childcare Net-
work and not presenting a proposal. The Network with experts from all
the twelve member states was asked to examine the situation in each
member state and formulate recommendations (Commission of the
European Communities, 1985).
Starting in 1987, the Childcare Network was extremely productive in
presenting reports on the situation in the various countries. Arguments
on behalf of children’s well-being dominated their contributions. The
reports the Network published in the late 1980s explicitly refer to
childcare as a “citizenship right” (European Commission Childcare
Network, 1990, p. 2; Moss, 1988, p. 292). Children are not only future
citizens, they should be treated as European citizens in their own right.
Co-ordinator Peter Moss (personal communication, July 10, 2002) ex-
plained that the Childcare Network felt it was society’s responsibility to
protect children from harm and distress and ensure that their care does
not depend on their parents’ income, but on their own needs.
Much as the European Parliament did in its 1986 Resolution, the
Childcare Network advocated a childcare Directive. Its standpoint on
state responsibility was even more explicit. Public authorities should
provide equal access to childcare for all children. Leaving childcare to
the social partners would exclude children of non-employed parents
from its benefits. Moreover, the state should be responsible for the qual-
ity of the services and the appropriate wages and working conditions of
childcare workers (European Commission Childcare Network, 1990).
So based on arguments on children’s well-being, the European Parlia-
ment and European Commission’s Childcare Network both favored
public childcare as a central welfare provision to be guaranteed by the
state.
In Childcare Network publications from 1988, arguments on equal
opportunities for men and women were also prominent. Increasing the
number of childcare facilities should contribute to a more equal division
of labor between men and women and expand freedom of choice. The
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sexual re-division of domestic care responsibilities entered the discus-
sion at this point. In 1990, the Childcare Network explicitly advocated a
greater involvement of men in the care of children:
Childcare is a “men’s issue” as much as a “women’s issue.” No
formula can be applied uniformly in all families–how responsibili-
ties are shared may vary between families and, within the same
family, may vary over time with one parent doing more at one
stage and less at another. Having acknowledged this, there is still
plenty of scope, and an urgent need, for greater involvement by
men in childcare (particularly in families but also as workers in
services) and for policies to encourage and support this process.
(European Commission Childcare Network, 1990, p. 3)
When the European Commission presented a draft Council Recom-
mendation on Childcare in 1991 (Commission of the European Commu-
nities, 1991), the discussion became more pragmatic. Notwithstanding
appeals from the European Parliament and its own Childcare Network,
the Commission chose to present a draft recommendation instead of a
directive. In an official statement to explain this choice, a Commission
official referred to the risk of a directive countering the dominant ideas
of subsidiarity (Debates of the European Parliament, 1991, p. 365). The
Commission obviously didn’t want to face the risk of the United King-
dom using its veto right at the Council of Ministers to block a Childcare
Directive, as it did with earlier proposals for directives on parental leave
and atypical work (see Rutherford, 1989).
To justify the policy, the European Commission took a less contro-
versial approach than the Childcare Network and European Parliament
had in the past. It replaced the argument on behalf of children’s well-be-
ing by one on economic efficiency to better suit the EU’s general goal to
establish a European market. It stated that a need for women’s growing
labor market participation is needed for demographic reasons. In addi-
tion, the Commission held that improving the level of childcare facili-
ties in the member states would facilitate the free movement of workers
in the labor market.
This argumentation on economic efficiency was supported with ref-
erences to equal opportunities, but only in a restricted sense. Equal op-
portunities were interpreted in a one-sided way as opportunities for both
sexes to participate in the labor market, but no references were made to
the sexual re-division of domestic care responsibilities. Only article 6
mentions the need for increasing men’s participation in caring for chil-
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dren. This reference was controversial enough to be the topic of serious
debate at the working group preparing the Council of Minister’s meet-
ings. The issue was state responsibility to intervene in how care respon-
sibilities were divided at home. The original proposal of the European
Commission noted “. . . in relation to the responsibilities arising from
the care and upbringing of children, it is recommended that member
states promote and encourage increased participation by men to achieve
a more equal sharing of parental responsibilities between men and
women” (Commission of the European Communities, 1991, p. 17).
The European Parliament proposed making this formulation more
concrete (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1991), but at
the Council working group, the British opposed this formulation and ar-
gued that the division of caring tasks is a family responsibility, not a
state one. On the request of the British, a statement was added that men
should always have freedom of choice with regard to caring activities. To
meet further British objections, the Dutch president proposed adding a
sentence to explain that men’s care was needed to enable women to par-
ticipate on the labor market (Departmental archive, Dutch Ministry of
Employment and Social Affairs [DAMESA], 1992 the Hague, file
aanbeveling 92/241/EEG inzake kinderopvang 31/03/1992). So the Rec-
ommendation defended men’s care for its instrumental value and no lon-
ger for its intrinsic value. The chair of the Council working group at the
time, Frank Schumacher, emphasized that this change was supported by
the other countries (personal communication, September 10, 2001).
Men’s participation in care was a controversial issue in the Council
of Ministers, but improving women’s participation in the labor market
was not, although there was a slight shift in justification. The European
Parliament and Economic and Social Committee had been concerned
with substantive equality, emphasizing women’s growing need to earn
their own income due to the rising divorce rate and growing number of
single parents (Official Journal of the European Communities, 1991;
1992b). The Council of Ministers combined a more formal approach to
gender equality with arguments concerning economic efficiency, em-
phasizing the growing need for women’s labor due to the ageing popu-
lation. A reference to women’s opportunities in the labor market was
obviously less controversial than a reference to their economic needs.
Female employment was needed to keep the welfare state affordable.
Whether or not it gave individual women enough income to support
their family was not discussed.
With the growing presence of economic and demographic argu-
ments, the assumptions concerning the role of the state also changed.
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References to children’s well-being may have promoted state responsi-
bility (as was argued by feminists and Social Democrats in the Euro-
pean Parliament) or the responsibility of the family and civil society (as
was argued by Conservatives and Christian Democrats), but with the in-
troduction of economic and demographic arguments, attention shifted
to the social partners. Here the British and the Dutch played a role in the
Council of Ministers. In the autumn of 1991, the Dutch president of the
Council of Ministers proposed responding to the British objections to
public responsibility for childcare by putting a greater emphasis on the
shared responsibility of national, regional and local governments, social
partners, non-governmental organizations and individuals. This change
in formulation helped overcome British objections. The German gov-
ernment emphasized the need to guarantee the quality of services, but
wasn’t supported by the other countries (DAMESA, 1992 the Hague,
file aanbeveling kinderopvang). References to public quality control
and the working conditions of childcare workers were left out of the
final recommendation. The Council of Ministers was thus able to adopt
the Childcare Recommendation on March 31, 1992.
Though the Recommendation was criticized by feminist authors as
being non-binding (Ostner & Lewis, 1995), it could also be seen as a de-
parture from the dominant views at the time on European social policy
(see Hoskyns, 1996). Childcare and the division of domestic care were
no longer strictly a national affair, but were acknowledged as the com-
mon responsibility of all the national and European actors. As Agnes
Hubert, the head of the EC Equal Opportunities Unit, noted (personal
communication, June 24, 2002):
At the time it was a revolutionary text. It put something on the EU
agenda that had never been there before. It was the first time the
European Union made an explicit reference to the involvement of
fathers in the upbringing of children. And there was something on
state and public responsibility for the care for children. Of course
the final result was less than the Childcare Network had initially
proposed, but we took the Recommendation as fairly progressive,
considering the context of the discussion.
In the European debate on childcare, arguments on children’s well-
being became less important, while references to economic efficiency
increased. References to equal opportunities were present throughout
the discussion, although the emphasis on the role of fathers in care lost
ground because it was given an instrumental rather than a principal
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value. In contrast, women’s labor market participation was felt to serve
a wider goal such as economic and fiscal policies. This shift in argu-
mentation corresponded with a shift in the actors considered responsi-
ble for providing services. The single emphasis on the role of either the
state (dual breadwinner policy logic) or the parents (male breadwinner
policy logic) was replaced by a policy logic on the shared responsibility
of the state, social partners, civil society and parents. To legitimize Eu-
ropean involvement in childcare policies, it was necessary to emphasize
the common responsibility of the various social and political actors.
Let us now examine whether the European childcare policy logic re-
sembles the national policy logics and vice versa. The three welfare
states in question are characterized as having strong male breadwinner
policy logics (Bussemaker, 1998; Lewis, 1997; Ostner & Lewis, 1995).
Historically, public childcare is poorly developed in these countries,
and in part as a result, the labor market participation of women is very
low. Being welfare states with traditionally limited public involvement
with childcare services, why did the issue enter national political agen-
das in the 1990s? And how did these countries implement the European
childcare recommendation?
The UK
In the 1980s and early 1990s, Conservative governments dominated
politics in the United Kingdom. The successive Conservative govern-
ments, headed by Margaret Thatcher and John Major (1979 -1997),
were against state responsibility for childcare. Even the marginal public
childcare that existed in the early 1980s became a subject of discussion
(Hansard, Col 150, 12-7-1988). Public childcare was among the poorest
in Europe and decreased even further (see Moss, 1991). The opposition
to traditional family policies was weak. Labor and trade unions held tra-
ditional views on childcare based on a male breadwinner ideology and
assumptions on the private nature of the family. Moreover, the feminist
movement was internally divided on paid work for women and public
childcare (Lovenduski & Randall, 1993).
Although the government didn’t want to be directly involved, it felt
that childcare services would support female labor market participation.
It formulated the explicit goal of increasing voluntary and private
childcare initiatives (Dwyer, 1998; Land & Lewis, 1998). To support
employer involvement in childcare, in 1991 the British introduced tax
relief plans for employers who provided workplace nurseries. The ef-
fects were limited though because high costs kept employers from pro-
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viding the facilities. In addition, the Conservative government tried to
stimulate employer childcare initiatives by launching the Opportunity
2000 project. The central aim was to create win-win situations that
served the interest of employers and (female) employees alike
(Gauthier, 1996). In addition to measures directed at employers, the
government wanted to stimulate other private services, like child-
minders and nannies. The 1989 Children’s Act regulated some of the
private initiatives at a minimal level. The Act obliged local authorities
to develop systems for registering private services and to provide
childcare for children in need (Land & Lewis, 1998).
Up until then, the Conservative government had maintained the em-
phasis on private responsibility for childcare that it had also advocated
at the European level. It feared any European social legislation, and in
the preparations for the Childcare Recommendation in the Council
working group, it argued that the division of caring tasks is the responsi-
bility of the family, not the state (DAMESA, 1992 file kinderopvang).
The British argument was successful in changing the proposed empha-
sis on public responsibility for childcare to a shared responsibility of lo-
cal and national governments, social partners, non-governmental
organizations and individuals. As a result, the recommendation no lon-
ger challenged the poor British childcare policies. Nevertheless, the
Conservatives began to cautiously recognize some public responsibility
for childcare. In the 1992 election campaign, the Conservative govern-
ment announced that there would be more out-of-school care sites start-
ing in 1993 (Gauthier, 1996). Overall, in the early 1990s, public
childcare developed step-by-step in the United Kingdom, usually linked
to labor market policy (see O’Connor, Orloff & Shaver, 1999).
The fundamental shift in childcare policy logic occurred in 1997 with
the change in political power at the national level. With New Labour in
power, public as well as private childcare facilities were expanded. In
contrast to the old Labour Party, where the male breadwinner ideology
still dominated, New Labour was explicitly committed to gender equal-
ity and state support for working women and their families (Sassoon,
1996; Siim, 2000). The Blair government formulated the explicit aim of
ensuring free facilities of good quality for all 4-year-olds whose parents
wanted them (Land & Lewis, 1998). The Blair government stated that
expanding childcare facilities serves both economic efficiency and chil-
dren’s well-being, calling childcare a shared responsibility of the state,
the social partners and private agencies. This argument was perfectly in
keeping with the approach of the European Childcare Recommendation
and resulted in an increase in facilities in the next years.
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The Netherlands
The turning point in Dutch childcare policy was around 1990, when
the expansion of childcare facilities became state policy. Until late into
the 1980s, the notion that private care was fundamental to children’s
well-being dominated the public debate. Public childcare was seen as
something immoral in a well-developed welfare state. Mothers were
supposed to stay at home and take care of their children. Since the
1970s, the state had only provided part-time playgroups for two- and
three-year-olds (“peuterspeelzalen”). Feminists and left-wing parties
were the only ones in favor of childcare services as a basic provision.
As in the UK, the Dutch Social Democrats (PvdA) had a longstand-
ing tradition of protecting traditional family and gender relations, and
until the late 1980s they had an ambivalent approach towards public
childcare. The Christian Democrats (CDA), in power with the Conser-
vative Liberals (VVD) in the 1980s, dominated the political debate on
childcare. They advocated a neo-Conservative ideology on the caring
society as opposed to state involvement. Christian Democrat Minister
of Welfare Elco Brinkman, known for his neo-Conservative ideas on
the family, noted that childcare should never become a general public
service (Bussemaker, 1997). In his opinion, state-funded childcare em-
bodied the evils of government interference and control in private life as
well as the indifference and selfishness of individual citizens who
allowed their own interests to prevail over those of their children.
It was only in the late 1980s that the male breadwinner policy logic
lost ground in the Netherlands. The implementation of the five Euro-
pean Directives on Equal Opportunities in Dutch social policy made the
principle of equal opportunities more influential. A growing consensus
emerged on the need for an economic restructuring of the welfare state.
Politicians started to defend women’s labor market participation with
arguments of economic efficiency and to present childcare as a means to
increase competitiveness.
This development can be explained by two factors. First, in 1989 a
new Cabinet of Social Democrats and Christian Democrats came into
power. The Social Democrats, like Labour in the UK, argued that public
childcare might contribute to children’s well-being and equal opportu-
nities for men and women. Entering the Cabinet, they were able to influ-
ence the policy process. Secondly, a report by the influential Scientific
Council for Government Policy (WRR, 1990) provided arguments to
legitimate public childcare to other political parties as well. It noted that
women’s labor market participation should be stimulated to ensure wel-
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fare provisions such as pensions in the long run. Childcare was an im-
portant requirement in this connection. It was no longer the division of
responsibility between the family and the state that was the issue, but
the shared responsibility of employees, companies and the state.
The new coalition of Christian Democrats and Social Democrats de-
veloped the first Dutch policy program to increase childcare, the Stimu-
lation Measure, in 1990. It introduced financial support for public and
private services. Since then, childcare has become a booming business
in the Netherlands. In particular, the historically unique coalition Cabi-
net of Liberals (VVD and D66) and Social Democrats (1994-2002)
made the expansion of childcare arrangements an important policy goal.
To stimulate companies setting up their own childcare facilities, in 1995
the Cabinet introduced tax incentives for employers. It argued financing
childcare should be a shared responsibility of the state, employers and
trade unions. Under the influence of European legislation, the Cabinet
also developed legislation on unpaid parental leave and introduced
fiscal measures to establish paid parental leave.
Thus arguments on economic efficiency, strategically combined with
arguments on equal opportunities for men and women, dominated the
Dutch public debate on childcare in the 1990s. The post-1990 expan-
sion of childcare facilities was more an effect of alterations in labor
market policy and the need for fiscal restructuring than of co-ordinated
policy on gender equality. In this respect, Dutch social policy was in
keeping with the changes in the European childcare debate, advocating
policy logics of economic efficiency.
Germany
Like the Netherlands, Germany witnessed a turning point around
1990 in the public childcare debate, though for very different reasons.
Germany’s reunification in 1989 suddenly confronted it with two very
different childcare systems. Former Communist East Germany had am-
ple state facilities for childcare, but in West Germany public facilities
were very rare and only supplemented by a few private efforts on the
part of the parents themselves.
As in the Netherlands, a strong male breadwinner policy logic pre-
vailed in West Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. The argument that
children were best cared for at home by their mothers dominated the
public debate. The Conservative Cabinets in the 1980s dominated by
the Christian Democrats (CDU and CSU) saw little reason to question
this approach. The only policy instrument which rose sharply in the
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1970s, public subsidies to host parents (“Tagesmütter”), declined in the
early 1980s (Ergas, 1990).
It was only after German unification in 1989 that childcare became
an important political issue. The government had to face the challenge
of combining two totally different systems into one. Christian-Demo-
crats did not want the expansion of public childcare to be linked to total-
itarianism, state control or state education, as they described the East
German situation. As the CDU stated in a pamphlet:
It was socialist but not social to wake small children from their
sleep at five in the morning and transport them in crowded vehi-
cles to institutions (“Einrichtungen”). At all these institutions . . .
children were exposed to a one-sided ideological model of control.
(CDU, Die Sozialpolitische Entwicklung in Deutschland-
Familien Förderung, date unknown)
In 1991 the Christian-Democrat government introduced a new Fed-
eral Act on Children and Youth Support (“Kinder-und Jugendhil-
fegestz”). One of its aims was to create a comprehensive and coherent
system of facilities for children in the 0-6 age group, regulating day care
centers, kindergartens, out-of-school care facilities and childminders.
The Act facilitated procedures for becoming a childminder, devoting at-
tention to the educational value of childcare. The basic argument for in-
creasing childcare was not economic efficiency, but children’s well-
being and a balanced family life. Men and women should decide freely
whether or not they wanted a career. In a debate about the new Act in
1991, Bundeskanzler Köhl spoke in terms of a right to childcare,
although he noted it should always be a free choice:
We want every person, male or female, to be able to choose freely
between family and a career or a combination of the two. There-
fore, . . . public childcare facilities and other forms of childcare
should increase. The German government will really do its
best to secure a right to childcare in the Law on Children and
Youth Support. (Verhandlungen 1990-1991, vol. 155, 12/5, p. 81)
When Kohl made this statement in the Bundestag, members of some
political parties broke out laughing. However, a year later they all
backed the new regulation. The Act on Children and Youth Support
committed the German state to guarantee public childcare for all chil-
dren in the 3-6 age group at nursery schools (“Kindergartens”), to take
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effect in 1996 (European Commission Childcare Network, 1996). Be-
cause not all the Länder [states] were able to implement the new law, in
1996 a transitional measure was to go into effect until 1999 (Ditch,
1996).
To a far greater extent than the Dutch and British debate, the political
debate in Germany echoed the arguments of the European Parliament
and European Childcare Network on childcare as a basic right for par-
ents and children. With the historical presence of public childcare ser-
vices in parts of the republic, arguments on the well-being of children
were relatively important. This also explains the German position in the
Council of Ministers, emphasizing the quality of services rather than the
majority argument of economic efficiency (DAMESA, 1992).
The Children and Youth Support Act represented a major step in Ger-
man childcare policy. Under a Christian-Democrat Cabinet, Germany
created a basic right to childcare. Apart from Bavaria, all the Länder ac-
cepted this right. In 1993 there was also a gradual expansion of partly
paid parental leave to 36 months. Combining work and family life grad-
ually reached a higher position on the German political agenda.
The three strong male breadwinner states started important changes
in their childcare policies in the early 1990s. In all three cases, welfare
state restructuring and the influence of European equal opportunities
policies helped make childcare a topic of public policy. In addition, spe-
cific political factors played a role. In Germany the reunification pro-
cess put childcare on the political agenda. In the Netherlands the
entrance of Social Democrats in the Cabinet pushed for change. In the
United Kingdom the threat of a demographic time bomb put childcare
on the political agenda. In the UK as well as the Netherlands, the ex-
pansion of childcare under the Conservatives and Christian Demo-
crats (in the Netherlands in coalition with Social Democrats) was
combined with more (the UK) or less (the Netherlands) market-driven
provisions. In Germany, a Christian Democrat Cabinet introduced a
basic right to childcare and generous paid parental leave. Here the
rather atypical emphasis of Christian Democrats on public childcare
was the result of a specific historical situation, the reunification of East
and West Germany.
The changes in the European debate on childcare were reflected in
the shifts in national policy logics. In all three countries, arguments con-
cerning the well-being of children and a traditional gender ideology
dominated social policy in the 1970s and 1980s. It was not until the end
of the 1980s that arguments concerning equal opportunities and com-
bining work and family life emerged. In the Netherlands and the UK,
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they were combined with references to economic efficiency. Childcare
facilities could facilitate the female labor market participation that was
needed to compensate for the ageing population, as was noted by advi-
sory boards. In Germany concerns for children’s well-being remained
relatively important, combined with references to equal opportunities (a
legacy from East Germany and EU policy). So, in the 1990s, in all three
countries political debates showed a shift from a male breadwinner pol-
icy logic towards a policy logic of shared responsibility for caregiving.
It would take a decade longer before the policy became effective.
DISCUSSION
The 1992 EU Childcare Recommendation represents a shift in the
European policy debate on childcare. The Council of Ministers replaced
arguments concerning the well-being of children, introduced by the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the European Childcare Network, with argu-
ments concerning economic efficiency and equal opportunities in the
labor market. This shift was also expressed in the policy debates at the
national level. In the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Germany
there was growing pressure to expand public childcare from social and
political actors (political parties, especially left-wing ones, trade un-
ions, employers and women’s groups) and from intellectuals (advisory
boards or networks of experts). However, the forces for change were
very different in the individual states. In the UK, strong Labour opposi-
tion and the demographic need for women’s labor market participation,
an effective argument for employers, were important factors stimulat-
ing public and private childcare. In the Netherlands, the Social Demo-
crats in the Cabinet in 1989 pushed for change, supported by arguments
on economic efficiency. German reunification confronted the country
with two different systems of childcare, stimulating the government to
formulate a new starting point for childcare and youth policy. Here ref-
erences to children’s well-being were used to replace the extensive
collective childcare services of the former East German regime by a
more voluntary right to public childcare.
So in the three member states, there were pushes for change from be-
low. There was also pressure from above, from the European level. In
the EU, there was a strong feminist call for equal opportunities at the
European Parliament and European Commission. In the 1970s and
1980s, equal treatment policies had a legitimizing function in the pro-
ject of European integration. With the transition to a common European
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Market in 1992, political pressure to develop European social policy in-
creased. The formulation of common policy aims on childcare at EU
level reconciled common economic interests (demographic changes
and the need for shaping an internal market), the need for equal op-
portunities for men and women and space for variety. The policy
logic advocating shared responsibility of employers and trade un-
ions, governments and families for childcare linked perfectly to the
logic of European economic integration.
Our analysis reveals interesting similarities between the debates in
states with former male breadwinner logics and the EU. There is a clear
interdependence between the policy logics on childcare at the national
and the European levels. It is difficult to say which direction the influ-
ence goes. The member states still seem to dominate the development of
European social policy. The opposition of one member state, the UK,
changed plans for a Childcare Directive into a less perilous Recommen-
dation. But, notwithstanding the absence of legal force, after the Rec-
ommendation public involvement in childcare in three countries with
formerly strong male breadwinner policy logics grew. The most strik-
ing growth was visible in the UK. By 2000, in the United Kingdom,
34% of children in the 0-3 age group were in formal childcare. In the
same period in Germany and the Netherlands formal childcare provi-
sion increased to 10% and 6%2 (OECD, 2001, p. 144). The focus on
economic integration did not prevent European social policy from cov-
ering the issue of caregiving, as had been predicted (Ostner and Lewis,
1995). On the contrary, the need for women’s labor market participation
came to be the main justification for European involvement in
childcare. Common pressure from social and political actors in the
member states and feminist actors at European institutions forced a
break in the dominant conception of European social policy (see
Bleijenbergh, 2004).
European involvement in childcare was to be further expanded a de-
cade later when European member states formulated clear target figures
for the expansion of childcare in Barcelona in 2002. By 2012, 33% of all
children in the age group 0-3 should be in formal childcare (European
Commission, 2002)
Our results are in keeping with the explanation of earlier unexpected
developments in European social policy based on common efforts of ac-
tors inside and outside EU institutions (Hoskyns, 1996; Vleuten, 2002).
The acknowledgement of the common responsibility of political actors,
social partners and non-governmental actors is also in line with
Falkner’s argument that the process of European integration came to ex-
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hibit a more corporatist pattern in the 1990s (Falkner, 1998). The 1992
Childcare Recommendation anticipated a new phase in European so-
cial policymaking. The Maastricht Treaty, signed several months
later, confirmed a greater involvement of social partners and national
political actors in the development of European social policy. Al-
though emphasizing shared responsibility with member states, social
partners, non-governmental organizations and parents, the Childcare
Recommendation first shows EU responsibility for childcare provision.
And although stimulating men’s role in childcare is only defended for
instrumental reasons, the Recommendation also exhibits a historically
new involvement in the sexual re-division of tasks in the private sphere.
NOTES
1. The then twelve member states of the EU were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the
United Kingdom. Since then the EU has widened to 25 countries.
2. The Dutch figure refers to 1998 instead of 2000.
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